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ABSTRACT
This paper presents new survey evidence that relative protection
against job loss grows with length of service, independent of their
net value to the firm. This protection makes good sense given that
at most companies employees appear to earn less than their value marginal
product in the early part of their tenure and more than their value
marginal product in the latter part; without job protection policies
for senior employees, the firm would have an incentive to terminate
them when their "spot" earnings went above their "spot" value marginal
product. In particular, we find that a very large percentage (over 95
percent) of hourly union members outside of agriculture and construction
arecovered by protective policies for senior workers and, that a
somewhat smaller, but still substantial, percentage (about 85 percent)
ofcomparable nonunion hourlies also have some protection against job
loss in their senior years. The potential reasons for these findings
are briefly discussed.
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(617)253—2661 (617) 495—4209Over the course of the past several years, there has been a growing
consensus among economists that wages grow more rapidly with company service
than does productivity. Substantial empirical evidence supporting this
proposition has been amassed and theorists have begun to developcoherent
explanations for the deferral of compensation from early to late in the
worklife.—' Clearly, employees should not be willing to accept wage
schemes under which they are paid less than their current contribution early
in the workilfe and promised more than their current contribution later in
the worklife unless they have some assurance of jobsecurity;— under
this sort of wage scheme, an employee who is prematurely terminated may lose
compensation to which he or she is in some sense entitled. Given the
existence of a substantial deferred—payment component in senior workers'
wages, It Is thus logical to ask the following questions: What guaranteedo
senior workers have that they will not be Involuntarily separated from their
jobs? How does the strength of this guarantee vary across settings?
The responses to a mail questionnaire which we recently sent to a
large sample of U.S. firms have provided useful data for answering the above
questions. Based on our survey results, we reach two central conclusions.
First, for a large majority of both union and nonunion employees, protection
against job loss grows with seniority. Reasonable estimates are that over
80 percent of nonunion employees and almost 100 percent of union employees
are employed in settings where senior employees are favored substantially in
reduction in force decisions, so that junior employees are laid off instead
of senior employees considered to be worth less on net to the firm. Second,
the relative risk of senior employees losing their jobs is substantiallysmaller in union settings than in comparable nonunion settings, even when
written provisions making seniority the most important factor in layoff
decisions are found at both.
Section I of the paper describes the collection of the survey data
on which our conclusions are based. The survey results appear in the next
two sections of the paper, with information on written layoff provisions
presented in Section II and our central results on actual layoff practice
presented in Section III. The paper's concluding section deals with the
interpretation and implications of our findings.
I. Collection of the Data
We sent our survey to 1,025 randomly selected nonagricultural,
nonconstruction firms from the 1981 edition of Standard and Poor's Register
and 250 randomly selected manufacturing firms from a 1980 News Front listing
of approximately 3,000 publicly held manufacturing corporations. Firms
based outside the U.S. were excluded from both samples. Standard and Poor's
generally lists companies with 50 plus employees and $1,000,000 plus in
sales in their Register. What fraction of total U.S. nonagricultural,
nonconstruction employment do these companies represent? Tabulations based
on the Nay 1979 Current Population Survey show that 56 percent of those
whose primary employment was in the nonagricultural, nonconstruction private
sector said they worked for companies with 100 plus employees and 70 percent
said they worked for companies with 25 plus employees. Data from the ES—202
program indicate that unemployment insurance reporting units with 50 or more
employees account for 64 percent of total covered private sector employment
outside agriculture and construction; since firms may contain more than one
unemployment insurance reporting unit, firms with 50 or more employees
—2—should account for some larger fraction of covered employment in the
relevant sectors. A conservative guess would be that the Standard and
Poor's listing contains firms accounting for perhaps two—thirds of total
U.S. nonagricultural, nonconstruction employment. We chose to oversample
manufacturing by adding companies from the News Front list because of the
very large fraction of the economy—wide variation in employment which occurs
in this sector.
Whenever possible, we mailed our survey to that individual at each
firm who appeared to be in charge of personnel matters (e.g., the Executive
Vice—President for Personnel, the Personnel Director or the Industrial
Relations Vice—President). In cases where no such individual's name could
be obtained, the letter was sent to the Chief Executive Officer of the
corporation. If no response was received from a firm within six weeks after
our first request was mailed, a second request was sent to the original
contact. Altogether, we received 429 responses from firms in the Standard
and Poor's sample (a response rate of 42 percent) and 113 responses from
firms in the News Front sample (a response rate of 45 percent). Because of
various data problems, there were in both cases somewhat fewer usable
responses.
A question at the start of the survey form asked how many exempt
employees (most likely managers and/or professionals), nonexempt salaried
employees and hourly employees were affected by the respondent's personnel
decisions; all subsequent answers refer to the largest of these subordinate
groups. One of the later questionnaire items inquired whether a majority of
those in the relevant group were covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. In the analysis which follows, we look separately at three
response categories: union hourly employees; nonunion hourly employees; and
3/ nonunion salaried employees (nonexempt and exempt combined).—
—3—Much previous work on the role played by seniority in layoff
decisions has focused on collective bargaining agreement provisions. We
asked whether either a collective bargaining agreement or a written policy
dealing explicitly with the role of seniority in permanent layoff decisions
covered the group of employees referred to by each respondent. Where we
were told that such an agreement or policy did exist, we asked whether the
relevant language stated that seniority should be the single mostimportant
factor in determining who would be laid off in the event ofa permanent
workforce reduction.
Our primary objective was to learn more about actual practice
concerning the role of seniority in permanent layoff decisions. Those
respondents who had witnessed a reduction in force which affected the
relevant work group were asked the following question:
In the event of a workforce reduction, are senior employees
permanently laid off in place of junior employees?
L7 Yes, If it is believed that the junior employee will be
worth more on net to the company than the senior
employee.
II Yes, if it is believed that the junior employee will
be worth sIgnIfIcantly more on net to the company than
the senior employee.
/T No, never.
This question produces the most important information in our dataset. The
responses indicate the strength of the favoritism afforded senior employees
when permanent layoffs occur.
In addition to the above information pertaining to permanent layoff
policies and practices, we also asked our survey respondents to tell us the
following: number of people employed by the firm (used in in units as a
firm size measure); information on products produced by the firm (used to
construct industry dummies); and the respondent's address (used to create
region dummies).
—4—[I. Written Layoff Provisions Covering Various Groups
As stated above, our questionnaire asked about written layoff
provisions covering both nonunion and union employee groups. The Bureauof
Labor Statistics has published data on the prevalence and characteristics of
layoff provisions contained in major collective bargaining agreements;
however, to the best of our knowledge, there exist no similar data on layoff
provisions contained in written policies covering nonunion employees.
Table 1 summarizes the relevant raw responses from our Standard and
Poor's firms. Almost a quarter of nonunion hourly groups (24 percent) are
covered by written layoff provisions which specify the role of seniority in
permanent layoff decisions. Interestingly, where such written provisions
covering nonunion hourly groups exist, a relatively large fraction (68
percent) state that seniority should be the most important factor in
deciding which employees to let go. Taken together, the above figures imply
that approximately 16 percent of nonunion hourly employee groups are covered
by written provisions which specify that seniority should be the most
important factor in permanent layoff decisions. Separate tabulations
indicate that, among nonunion hourly employee groups, those at larger firms
are more likely to be covered by this sort of provision, a result which
holds up even when industry and region are controlled for. We return to
this finding below. The nonunion salaried responses indicate that only a
tiny fraction of those employee groups (under 3 percent) are covered by
written last—in--first—out layoff provisions.
How does unionization affect the probability that the rules
governing seniority's role in cutbacks will be spelled out in writing?
Fully 92 percent of the responses for hourly union employees (versus 24
percent for hourly nonunion employees) indicated the presence of written
—5—Table 1: Data from Standard and Poor'sSample on Contract and Written




Proportion for which contract
orwritten policy specifies role
of seniority in permanant layoff
decisions .921 .239
Given a contract or written policy
which specifies seniority's role,
proportion for which relevant language
states seniority to be most important
factor in permanent layoff decisions .844 .684 .429
Proportion for which language in
a contract or written policy states
seniority to be most important factor
in permanent layoff decisions.' .777 .164 .03C
Number of observations on which
above proportions based 139 159 1l
The figures in this roware equal to the product of the figures in the
two rows above.
—6—provisions dealing with the role of seniority in permanentlayoff
decisions. Of such provisions covering hourly union employees, 84 percent
(versus 68 percent for hourly nonunion employees) stipulated that seniority
should be the most important factor in layoff decisions. Overall, the above
proportions imply that 78 percent of union hourly groups (versus16 percent
of nonunion hourly groups) are covered by written provisions which make
seniority the most important factor in permanent layoff decisions.
The raw figures presented in Table 1 could potentially be
misleading insofar as the responses we received from firms on our Standard
and Poor's list were not randomly distributed with respect to firm size and
industry (as reported in the Register listings for the firms we surveyed).
Large firms were more likely to return our questionnaire than small firms.
Firms in the mining, manufacturing, transportation, communications,
utilities, or trade sectors were more likely to provide answers pertaining
to hourly employees than were firms in the service, finance, insurance or
real estate sectors; the opposite was true for answers pertaining to
salaried employees. In addition, it would arguably be preferable to
estimate the proportion of employment to which a given statement applied
rather than the proportion of employee groups to which the same statement
applied. These considerations lead us to develop two sets of weighted
figures. The first set of weights corrected for response rate variation
across nine firm size/industry cells; the second set yielded estimates of
employment proportions rather than employee group proportions. These
weightings did not change any of our qualitative conclusions.
A further concern is that the figures presented in Table 1 might be
misleading if the respondent firms differed systematically in unobservable
ways from the nonrespondent firms. Obviously, we have nodirect information
on the answers that nonrespondents would have given to our survey
—7—questions. However, we do have answers both from firms that responded to
our original mailing and from firms that responded only after we sent thema
followup mailing. Comparison of early versus late responders provides a
seemingly reasonable test of whether our estimated proportions should be
considered suspect because of likelynonresponse bias. We divided the
sample used in Table I into early responders and lateresponders, then
recalculated the raw proportions presented there separately for thetwo
groups. The only noteworthy difference is that early nonunion hourly
respondents were significantly more likely than late nonunion hourly
respondents to report the existence of a written policy governing theuse of
seniority in permanent layoff decisions (.283 versus .135). Thisgap does
not appear to be attributable to differences in the firmsize, industry
and/or region characteristics of the twogroups. Thus, the Table 1 figures
for the nonunion hourly population must be treated withsome caution.
Partial confirmation that the figures presented in Table 1 are
reasonable can be garnered from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)data on
major collective bargaining agreement provisions. The most recent relevant
BLS data are for 1970—1971. They indicate that 95percent of major
collective bargaining agreements outside of construction containsome type
of layoff provision. Examination of asample of those contracts containing
layoff provisions showed seniority to be the "sole" or "primary" factor in
determining layoff rights for 74 percent of the contracts in thesample,
exclusive of those contracts in which the issue was "subjectto local
negotiations,"' Combining the relevantfractions, the BLS data imply
that just over 70 percent of union hourly employeegroups are covered by
layoff provisions which specify that seniority should be themost important
factor in permanent layoff decisions; the comparable figure derived from our
Standard and Poor's responses was 78 percent,
—8—III. Practice Concerning the Role of Seniority in Actual Layoff Decisions
Ultimately we would like to know not only what written policies or
collective bargaining agreements say about the role of seniority in
permanent layoff decisions but also how much weight seniority actually
receives when a reduction in force occurs. In this section, we first
discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the survey data we have collected
for exploring actual layoff practice. Our next step Is to look at the
overall pattern of responses to our question concerning how permanent layoff
decisions are made. We then proceed to a more careful examination of the
various factors which we expect to influence the weight given to seniority
in reduction—in—force situations, giving particular consideration to union
versus nonunion differences.
Pros and Cons of Using Survey Data to Explore Layoff Practice
There are several reasons for our belief that the survey data on
layoff practice we have collected can provide a better overall picture of
the role played by seniority in firms' permanent layoff decisions than any
feasible analysis of actual layoff rates.
Suppose that we could obtain detailed personnel records for a large
number of firms that had carried out reductions In force. These records
could be used to calculate firm—specific permanent layoff rates for
employees with varying amounts of seniority. Unfortunately, a lower layoff
rate among senior employees at any particular firm could result either from
those employees having greater expected net worth or from their receiving
favored treatment. Thus, this layoff rate information would have to be
supplemented with information on individuals' expected net worth to their
firms before one could be certain of its interpretation. Our questionnaire
—9—asks whether senior employees are favored in permanent layoff decisions
rather than whether layoff rates are loweramong senior employees. The
responses obtained thus should shed light on an issue that layoff rate data
alone could never help us with.
In actual fact, firm—specific layoff rates for workers with
different amounts of seniority would beexceedingly difficult to obtain.
Longitudinal micro data sets like the NationalLongitudinal Survey (NLS) and
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)are possible sources of
information on permanent layoff rates. Thereare at least two serious
problems with using these data for thepurpose at hand, in addition to that
discussed above. First, the unit of observation is theindividual, not the
firm. To see how this might cause problems,suppose that union sector
layoffs typically occurred at sites with mostly long—serviceemployees but
that nonunion sector layoffs typically occurred at sites withmostly
recently—hired employees. In this situation, even if senior unionemployees
at any given site are relatively less likely to be laid off thanwould be
true without a union, the aggregate data might show less declinein the
layoff rate with length of service in the union sector than in the nonunion
sector. This sort of problem can only be avoided through theuse of firm
level, rather than individual level, data. A second problem with both the
NLSandthe PSID is that the sample sizes are relatively small.For
example, the PSID offers usable observations on permanent layoff experience
over the 1974—1975 period for only 70 private sectornonagricultural,
nonconstruction union blue collar workers with 2O—plusyears of company
service and for only 43 comparable nonunion workers. Thesemay sound like
reasonably large numbers; however, even during the 1974—1975 recession the
annual permanent layoff rate for individuals with 20plus years of company
—10—service was probably no more than 5 percent, so that much largernumbers
would be needed to reliably detect even large proportional differences
between the union and the nonunion rates.
The survey data on layoff practice analyzed in this section of the
paper have the advantages of pertaining directly tothe question of whether
senior employees are favored in permanent layoff decisions and of providing
a relatively large number of firm—level observations. Perhapsthe most
serious shortcoming of the data is that each observation represents only one
person's assessment of how layoff decisions at his orher firm are made.
Ideally, one would like to collect information on of the layoff decision
process at each firm from people at all levelsof the corporate hierarchy,
including those at lower levels as well as those at the top level. Another
potential weakness of the data is that our respondents might notbe wholly
candid concerning seniority's role in permanent layoff decisions. While
this possibility cannot be ruled out, we see no good reason for our
respondents to mislead us, particularly since they were assured thattheir
responses would be kept strictly confidential. On balance, wewould argue
that our data represent the best available source of information for
exploring the role played by length of service in reductions inforce.
The Pattern of Actual Layoff Practice
Table 2 summarizes the raw responses concerning actual layoff
practice received from our Standard and Poor's firms. Asubstantial
majority of the answers pertaining to nonunion hourly groups indicatethat
senior employees enjoy considerable protection against being permanently
laid off, meaning either that a senior employee would never be let go ahead
of a junior employee (42 percent of all responses) or that thiswould occur
—11—only if the junior employee was considered to be worth significantly more to
the firm on net (44 percent of all responses). Evenamong the responses
pertaining to nonunion salaried groups, 24 percent indicate that a senior
employee would never be let go ahead of a junior employee and 57percent
indicate that this would occur only if the junior employee was consideredto
be worth significantly more to the firmon net.
How does the layoff protection afforded senior unionemployees
compare to that afforded senior nonunion employees? Comparing the relevant
figures for union hourly and for nonunion hourly employee groups, 97 percent
of the union respondents versus 86 percent of the nonunionrespondents
reported substantial protection for senior employees and 84 percent of the
union respondents versus 42 percent of the nonunion respondentsreported
that a senior employee would never be let go in place of a junioremployee.
Thus, layoff protection for senior union employees seems to be both more
prevalent and stronger than that for senior nonunion employees in broadly
similar jobs.
We also calculated two sets of weighted proportions like theraw
proportions just discussed. The first set of weights corrected for response
rate variation across nine firm size/industry cells and the second set
yielded estimates of ent proportions rather than employeegroup
proportions. None of the weighted proportions differs appreciably from the
comparable raw proportions.
To determine whether we ought to be concerned aboutpossible
nonresponse bias in the figures presented in Table 2, we again divided the
observations into those received from early responders and thosereceived
from late responders, then prepared separate tabulations for the two
groups. There were no significant differences between the two sets of
numbers.Table 2: Data from Standard and Poor's Sample onActual Practice Concerning




Proportion reporting that senior
employee never let go ahead of
junior employee .836 .423 .238
Proportion reporting that senior
employee let go if junior employee
believed to be worth significantly
more on net .137 .437 .571
Proportion reporting that senior
employee let go if junior employee
believed to be worth more on net .027 .141 .190
Number of observations on which
above proportions based 73 71 21
a! only respondents who had witnessed permanent layoffs were asked what
practice was followed in deciding which employees to let go.
-13-Modelling the Analysis of Factors Affecting Actual Layoff Practice
What underlies the union/nonunion differences in layoff practice
just noted? Given similarly-worded written policy statements governing the
role of seniority during reductions in force, are the actual layoff
practices followed in union and nonunion settings also similar? In
econometric terms, answering these questions requires that we explain the
variation in a trichotomous dependent variable which captures senior
employees' vulnerability to being involuntarily terminated ahead of junior
employees during a reduction in force. This can be modelled using an
ordered probit. Assume that there exists some unobserved continuous
variable, y, which measures senior employees' relative vulnerability to
layoff. We do not observe y directly but do have some Information about y.
Specifically, it can be assumed that if the y value for a particulargroup
is below some thresholdc1, our survey respondents will say that a senior
employee would never be let go before a junior employee; that ify is
between c1 and some higher threshold levelc2, respondents will say that
a senior employee would be let go before a junior employee only if the
junior employee was worth significantly more on net to thecompany; and that
if yis abovec2, respondents will say that a senior employee would be let
go before a junior employee if the junior employee was worth more on net to
the company. Let the latent variable y be a function of various X's
including union status and the terms of written layoff provisions:
(1) y=X+c
where y represents the unobserved continuous measure of senioremployees'
vulnerability to permanent layoff, the X's are Independent variables, the
's are parameters,is an error term, and I indexes observations. If the
—14—C's are normally distributed, the probability of a respondent Indicating
that a senior employee would never be involuntarily terminated before a
junior employee is equal to:
1c—XE
Iexp(—z /2) dz
the probability of a respondent indicating that only a senior employee who
was worth significantly less on net than a junior employee would be let go
first is equal to:
1
2
(3) _____1 exp(—z /2) dz /
andthe probability of a respondent indicating that a senior employee would
be permanently laid off before a junior employee who was worth more on net
is equal to:
1
2 C) I exp(—z/2)dz,
r2Trc-XE
Standard maximum likelihood methods can be used to estimate c1, c2 and
theE 's. Given the way the model has been set up, a positive coefficient
implies greater senior employee vulnerability to being involuntarily
terminated.
Factors Affecting Senior Employees' Relative Vulnerability to
Permanent Layoff
The models presented in Table 3A were estimated using the ordered
probit technique just described. We included responses from firms In our
News Front sample In estimating these equations. Since the various
-15--potentially relevant factors are likely to have a different impact on
permanent layoff decisions affecting salaried employees, we included only
union hourly and nonunion hourly observations in the sample used to fit
these models.
Column (1) presents the coefficient estimates obtained for a model
which included a union dummy plus firm size, industry and region variables.
The union hourly dummy assumes a large, statistically significantpositive
coefficient. Thus, controlling for size of firm, industry and region does
not alter the conclusion which emerged from the simple cross—tabulations in
Table 2, that senior union hourly employees are relatively less vulnerable
to permanent layoff than senior nonunion hourly employees. The coefficient
estimates from model (1) can be used to predict the probability that union
and nonunion respondents with otherwiseaverage characteristics for
nonagricultural, nonconstruction blue collar workers (as derived from the
May 1979 CPS) would give each of the three possible answers to the question
we asked about the role of seniority in actual layoff decisions; these
probabilities are reported in Table 3B. Union respondents are almost twice
as likely as similar nonunion respondents to say that a senior employee
would never be permanently laid off in place of a junior employee (.773
versus .410); union respondents are 6.5 times less likely than similar
nonunion respondents to say that a senior employee would be permanently laid
off if it was believed that a junior employee would be worth more on net
(.025 versus .162).
While the result just documented is interesting in itself, it also
raises some further questions. In particular, we wondered whether union and
nonunion employee groups covered by similarly—worded written layoffpolicies
would in fact be treated similarly when workforce reductions occurred.
Column (2) reports on the results of estimating an ordered probit equation
—16—Table 3A: Factors Affecting Actual Practice Concerningthe Role of













Union hourly group .512 —.977 —.588
(yes =1) [.5011 (.190) (.240)
Written layoff provision .527
specifying seniority [.501] —.981
key factor in permanent (.287)
layoff decisions (yes =1)
Other written layoff provision .138 .270
(yes =1) [.346] (.391)
Ln (number persons employed) 6.239 —.008 .045
[1.8281 (.045) (.058)
Trade, transportation, commun-
ications and utilities (yes =1) .113 —.074 —.338
[.318] (.513) (.383)
Services, finance, insurance
and real estate (yes =1) .044 .393 .268
[.206] (.446) (.449)
Northeast (yes 1) .350 —.412 —.330
[.478] (.221) (.251)
South (yes =1) .167 .182 .157
[.374] (.255) (.254)









!These estimates are based on data from both the Standard and Poor's and
the Newsfront samples. Only respondents who had witnessed permanent layoffs


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 which includesa union hourly dummy plus a dummy variable which equals one
if there is a written layoff provision specifying that seniorityshould be
the most Important factor in permanent layoff decisions and a second dummy
variable which equals one if there is some other written layoff provision,
in addition to firm size, industry, and region controls. Two things about
the parameter estimates obtained are of particular interest.
The first noteworthy fact is that, not surprisingly, written
provisions which specify that seniority should be the most Importantfactor
in layoff decisions are associated with a substantial reduction In senior
employees' relative vulnerability to losing their jobs. As canbe seen by
looking at Table 3B, coverage by a last—in—first—out layoff provision
increases the probability of a "senior employee never let go before a junior
employee" response by .297 for a union group with otherwise average
characteristics (from .590 to .887) and by .373 for a comparable nonunion
group (from .360 to .733). The corresponding reductions inthe probability
of a "senior employee let go If junior employee believed to be worth more on
net" response are .054 for a union group with sample average characteristics
(from .060 to .006) and .142 for a nonunion group with sample average
characteristics (from .168 to .026)..' Written layoff provisions which do
not specify that seniority should be the key factor in layoff decisions have
no statistically significant estimated effect on senior employees'
vulnerability to losing their jobs.
The second noteworthy fact is that unionism per se still seems to
matter even after the above—described written layoff provision variables are
introduced. The union hourly dummy coefficient in the column (2) equation
is strongly significant. On average, unionization is associated with a.189
increase in the probability of a "senior employee never let go before a
junior employee" response (from .543 to .732) and with a .066 decreasein
—19—the probability of a "senior employee letgo if junior or employee believed
to be worth more on net"response (from .103 to .037). These effects are
roughly 50 percent as large as thecorresponding effects derived from the
model which included no layoffprovision controls, meaning that differences
in the existence and nature of writtenlayoff provisions covering union
versus nonunion groups can account forperhaps half of the reduction in
senior employees' vulnerability tolayoff that is associated with union
status.
The Table 3 models do notdirectly address the question of which
senior nonunion hourly employeesenjoy the greatest protection against being
permanently laid off. We estimated a second set of modelslike those in
Table 3 using only nonunion hourly observation.Since nonunion hourly
employee groups at larger firms aresignificantly more likely to be covered
by written provisions specifying a key role forseniority in permanent
layoff decisions, we expected that thein of employment variable in the
model patterned after that in column (1)would assume a significant negative
coefficient, This coefficient was in fact closeto zero and statistically
insignificant. One way to state these results is thatlarge and small
employers of nonunion hourly employees differmore in form than in substance
with regard to layoff decisionsaffecting long—service workers.
Are the results presented in Table 3apt to be contaminated by
nonresponse bias? The appropriate x2testsshow that neither adding a
dummy variable which captures whether an observationrepresents a late
responder nor adding a full set of interaction termsto the ordered probit
equations contributes to the models' explanatorypower.
We were also concerned about the possibleexistence of a somewhat
different type of bias that has not beenmentioned until this point, One
might argue that what we should be interested inknowing is the distribution
—20—across all employers of practice with regard to the role played byseniority
in the event a permanent layoff occurs; what we actually observe is the
distribution of relevant practice across the set of employers such that
respondents there have witnessed reductions in force. These two
distributions may differ. One might expect that firms which avoid layoffs
as a matter of policy might also place greater emphasis on seniority in the
event that a layoff does occur. There is no satisfactory method of dealing
with this problem. However, we did experiment with estimating a censored
ordered probit model. Censoring takes place because we only observe layoff
practice at those firms where our respondents have witnessed reductions in
force; we specified a probit equation containing the ln of firm size,
industry dummies and region dummies to describe this censoring process. We
then reestimated each of our ordered probit equations simultaneously with
this censoring equation using maximum likelihood methods, allowing for some
correlation rho between the relevant errors. Unfortunately, we were unable
to achieve usable estimates.' At this point, the best we can do is note
that the censoring of our data is a potential concern.
IV. Concluding Thoughts
The results just reported indicate that over 80 percent of private
sector nonagricultural, nonconstruction employment is located in settings
where senior workers enjoy substantial protection against losing their
jobs. One would expect at least a credible promise of this sort of
protection to accompany wage policies which pay workers less than their
value marginal product early in their tenure and more than their value
marginal product late in their tenure. Nonetheless, it might be asked what
actually motivates firms to adhere to a practice of favoring senior
—21—employees when cutbacks affecting their nonunion workforce occur, given that
there would appear to be a short—run incentive to terminate senioremployees
Instead of junior employees expected to be worth more on net to the firm.
Someone unacquainted with U.S. law mightsuppose that senior
nonunion workers were guaranteed some legal protection against losing their
jobs. In fact, senior nonunion workers have virtually no legalrecourse If
they are laid off before their juniors. Ignoring situations in which a
termination has been predicated on a considerationexpressly made unlawful
by statute (e.g., sex, race, religion, national origin,age, union
organizational activity, or protected concerted activity), nonunion
employment relationships are generally "terminable at will," regardless of
an employee's length of service. Even written company manualsstating that
layoffs will occur In inverse order of years of service have not generally
been viewed by the courts as enforceable contracts, becauseemployers have
the right to alter this "policy" at any time.Z.1 Nevertheless, Itappears
that practices favoring senior workers dogo hand in hand with stated
policies to that effect; our survey responses indicate that nonunion firms
with Inverse—seniority layoff policies are second only to union firmswith
such provisions In their collective bargaining contracts when Itcomes to
actually protecting senior workers' jobs.
Other possible motivations for nonunion firms to protect the jobs
of senior workers where current pay is above current contribution Include:
avoiding unionization; maintaining the morale of the current workforce so
that short—term efficiency is not Impaired; andpreserving the firm's
reputation as a fair employer so that prospective new hires are not deterred
from joining the firm's workforce. Informationconcerning the relative
importance of these three potential motlvators would greatly enhance our
understanding of the issue at hand.
—22—While a significant number of senior hourly nonunion workers are
protected against some forms of job loss, senior hourlyunion workers are
both more often protected and better protected. As mentioned above, we
estimate that almost 100 percent of private sector hourly union workers
outside of agriculture and construction receive job loss protection,
compared to about 85 percent of such nonunion workers; further, we estimate
that over 80 percent of these hourly union workers were covered by plans
which would "never" result in the involuntary termination of a senior
employee in place of a junior employee, whereas only about40 percent of
such hourly nonunion workers were so securely protected. Why do union
members receive better protection than comparable nonunion workers?
One reason for expecting senior workers to be more favored in
layoff decisions in union than in nonunion settings is that the collective
bargaining process very likely leads to older workers' preferences receiving
greater weight than they otherwisewould.1 Unionism also adds two
enforcement mechanisms: the law and the union itself. As discussed above,
nonunion workers are generally not protected by law from losing their jobs
in place of more junior employees; union members' contracts are enforceable
in court and so have added weight. In addition, the union itself can
monitor employer actions to ensure employer compliance with seniority rules;
in a nonunion setting, most workers will probably not have much power to
make sure the employer is keeping his word. And, in the most desperate
situations, the union can organize work interruptions, giving it a powerful
bargaining tool in the establishment, preservation, and carrying out of
seniority provisions.
Our result that senior unionized workers enjoy relatively greater
protection against job loss than comparable senior nonunion workers mayhelp
with the resolution of a puzzle that has disturbed diverse analysts.
Numberous studies of the impact of trade unionism have concluded that length
—23—of service raises union wages less than nonunionwages, which suggests that
senior workers benefit less from unionism than dojunior workers. This
result is puzzling because, as just stated, it is generallysupposed that
senior workers' preferences carrygreater weight in union settings. Recent
research suggests that the solution to this paradoxmay be found in a
demonstration that, whereas wages rise lessrapidly with seniority under
unionism, the expected value of total compensation rises more rapidly.2!
One of the most important benefits increasing theslope of the
union—service! expected—economic—rewards profile is thegreater job
protection provided under unionism.
Thus far in this paper we have presented evidencethat senior
unionized workers enjoy greater protectionagainst permanent layoff
vis—a—vis junior unionized workers than do senior nonunionworkers vis—a—vjs
junior nonunion workers. Is it also true that senior unionized workersare
less vulnerable to losing their jobs than seniornonunion workers? To put
the issue somewhat differently, we have shown that unionismreduces senior
workers' relative vulnerability topermanent layoff; is it also true that
unionism reduces senior workers' absolute vulnerability? Thismight not be
the case if the presence of a union increased theoverall permanent layoff
rate sufficiently to outweigh the fact that senior union workersare lower
on the list of those to be let go. Back—of—the—envelopecalculations based
on our survey data suggest that senior union workers have a much lower
probability of being permanently laid off than do senior nonunion
workers.' Francine Blau andLawrence Kahn have recently reported on the
1971—1972 permanent layoff experience of those included in theNLS male
panels; their results are supportive of the belief that,among older
(presumably more senior) men, coverage by a collective bargainingagreement
11/ is associated with a lower permanent layoff rate.— Other evidenceon
—24—union policies during downturns is consistent with these findings. While
during mild recessions, unions favor the use of temporary layoffs to
maintain high wage rates, as downturns begin to threaten the jobs of senior
employees, unions become more willing to discuss wage cuts, reopening of
contracts, and changes in work rules and policies. This change in union
behavior can be seen by studying the 1974—1975 and currentrecessions.-'
To summarize, we have found that even though senior nonunion
workers are often protected against job loss in place of more junior
workers, unionism raises the incidence and strength of such protection.
While both implicit and explicit contracts may exist, they appear to have
significantly different consequences for senior workers. Job rights appear
to grow with seniority to a much greater extent under collective bargaining.
—25—FOOTNOTES
1/ For a summary of empirical evidence pertaining to the deferral of
compensation from early to late in the workilfe, see F1edcff and Abraham
[1981]. Theoretical work related to the question of why sucn deferred
compensation schemes might be adopted includes Becker and Stigler
[1974], Salop and Salop [1976], Viscusi [1978], Lazear [1979], Harris
and Hoinstrom [1981], and Iannrides and ?issarides [1982].
2/ In principle, a policy of awarding appropriate severancepay it.the
eventof a termination could accomplish the same end as a policy rf
assuring senior employees' job security. We have seer. no gno evidence
that many workers are in fact covered by severancepay plans which serve
this purpose. As of 1978, only 37 percent of the major contract
workforce was covered by severance pay provisions. Tabulaticns based or.
the 1974 Employer Expenditures for Employee Compensation survey
(described in ij.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [l976] indicate that 2
percent of union production employees and only 3 percent of nonunior.
production employees worked in establishments where the employer made
contributions to a severance pay or supplemental unemployment benefit
fund during l972 Even where severance pay plans exist, it is not at
all clear that the formulas used for determining the level of benefits
appropriately compensate laid off employees for the stream of deferred
wages they lose. In addition, at least in the union sector, it appears
that severance pay provisions most often accompany rather than replace
provisions which protect senior employees against being laid off. See
Medoff and Abraham [1981] for a discussion of why one would not expect
severance pay plans to be the preferred mechanism for protecting senior
employees' deferred earnings.
—26—3/ There were a very small number of responses pertaining to unionized
salaried employees which were excluded from the sample we used f or
analysis.
4/ These data are reported in U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [1972].
5/ The probability changes for the union group do not equal those for the
nonunion group because the ordered probit Is a nonlinear model; that is,
the changes in the probabilities of being in the various categories
produced by a given change in X depend upon the initial level ofX3.
6/ When we allowed rho to vary freely, it approached one rapidly but the
likelihood function failed to converge. We then looked at a series of
constrained models, with rho set equal to 0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and
1.0 in turn. The model with rho equal to one produced the best fit.
However, it is unclear what this means.
7/ A number of recent state court decisions have begun to modify the
"employment at will" doctrine using the theory of employees having
"implied contracts" with their employers, but these jurisdictions are
still very much in the minority. See Bureau of National Affairs [1982]
for an up—to—date discussion of legal developments in this area.
8/ See Freeman and Medoff [forthcoming]. Giving greater weight to senior
workers' preferences may or may not be socially desirable; this point is
developed in an interesting paper by Kuhn [1982].
9/ See Freeman and Medoff [forthcoming].
10/ In our survey data, 61 percent of union hourly respondents and 52
percent of nonunion hourly respondents said they had witnessed workforce
reductions; the average portion of the relevant work group affected was
14 percent for the union hourlies and 12 percent for the nonunion
hourlies. Thus, a reasonable, if crude, estimate Is that over the
relevant reference period 9 percent of union hourly workers and 6
percent of nonunion hourly workers were permanently laid off. How many
of these could conceivably have been senior employees? Only 16 percent
—27—of our union hourly respondents said that senior employees might
sometimes be let go ahead of junior employees; 58 percent of our
nonunion hourly respondents said this might sometimes happen. Thus,
among union employees layoffs involving roughly 1 percent of the
workforce might have affected senior workers, whereas among nonunion
employees layoffs involving roughly 3 percent of the workforce might
have affected senior workers.
11/ See Blau and Kahn [1981].
12/ See Medoff [1979] for an examination of the impact of collective
bargaining on temporary layoffs which analyzes data from the 1974—75
downturn. For discussions of collective bargaining during the current
recession, see Dunlop [1982] and Mitchell [1982].
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